

Brezhnev Asserts Soviet Doctrine Rules Out Preventive Nuclear War

By SERGE SCHMEMANN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Nov. 3 — Soviet newspapers published a statement today by Leonid I. Brezhnev rejecting the idea that Moscow might launch a preventive nuclear strike and disclosing unusual details about Soviet deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The Soviet leader's statement, in the form of replies to questions from the West German news magazine Der Spiegel, took up three-quarters of the first page and most of the second page in Pravda, the Communist Party paper.

Display of Major Pronouncement

It was a display reserved for major policy pronouncements, and Western diplomats described it as a "skillful reiteration" of Soviet positions on the East-West balance of power, disarmament and détente.

Mr. Brezhnev, responding to the view that the Soviet Union represented a military threat, affirmed that Moscow harbored no aggressive designs.

"Our military doctrine has a defensive character," he said. "It excludes preventive wars and the concept of a 'first strike.'"

Disclosing what are normally closely kept missile secrets, Mr. Brezhnev said

Excerpts from statement, page A6.

that 975 medium-range weapons were deployed in the European part of the Soviet Union. He also said that its new generation of medium-range missiles, the SS-20's, were capable of delivering three warheads, but contended that "their total detonating power is less than that of one of the old types."

He used the figures to support his contention that an "approximate balance" existed between Soviet and Western medium-range missiles in Europe. This view has been rejected by the United

Continued on Page A6, Column 6

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NYT 4 Nov 1981

Excerpts From Brezhnev's Printed Answers

Following are excerpts from questions submitted by Der Spiegel, the West German news magazine, to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, and his written answers as published Monday by Der Spiegel and translated by The New York Times from the German:

Fate of Détente

Q. East-West relations today appear burdened by strong tensions. How do you see the situation in the world and how do you see the fate of détente?

A. It is turbulent on the earth today. In several parts of the world trouble spots are arising. The arms race with weapons of mass destruction goes on. New kinds of arms are developed which are especially dangerous because they, as the experts say, lower the threshold to a war with nuclear weapons, that is, make its outbreak more probable. Especially insidious seem to be in this regard the utterances of some strategists and politicians in the West about the admissibility of a "limited" nuclear war and the possibility of winning this war.

But if one addresses the heart of the matter, a "limited" nuclear war can't exist at all. Once begun—in Europe or somewhere else—a nuclear war would unavoidably and irrevocably take on a worldwide character. Such is the logic that is inherent to war as such and the character of today's arms and international relations. That one has to see clearly and grasp it.

The Soviet Union is menacing no one and does not have the intention of assaulting anyone. Also, our military doctrine has a defensive character. It excludes preventive wars and the concept of "first strike."

Desire for Friendly Ties

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we are, as I have already repeatedly said, seriously prepared to maintain normal relations with the United States based on mutual respect and taking into account the rights and interests of each. More than this, we wish to have good, friendly relations with the U.S.A. and cooperate with it in the interest of strengthening peace in the world.

Soviet-American negotiations about the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe are imminent. Following these, we hope, the SALT negotiations will begin. President Reagan recently announced the readiness of the U.S. to discuss other problems where there are differences of opinion between the two countries as well. We welcome this readiness, because we have always considered negotiations the suitable means for the solution of international problems. But of course, what matters above all is that words are supported by deeds.

Regarding the dreams of reaching military superiority over the U.S.S.R., one would do better to drop them. If it has to be, the Soviet people would find the possibility to undertake any additional efforts and to do everything that is necessary to guarantee a reliable defense of their country.

A special role in safeguarding the peace and deepening détente devolves, of course, upon Europe. For one thing, it is the narrowest and most fragile of all the "houses" that would inevitably fall victim to a nuclear conflagration.

Weapons in Europe

Q. Medium-range weapons, Soviet as well as American, have come to be one of the most acute problems. Do you still see a way of stopping this development?

A. I have said that already more than once. We are of the opinion that there is no sector of disarmament and no category of arms about which one couldn't agree. Likewise the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe can be solved in the interest of all European peoples. Can and must be.

From the 1950's on the U.S. stationed nuclear arms in Europe and adjacent waters in order to be able to strike at vital centers in the U.S.S.R. and its allies. These weapons were called "forward-based systems." At the same time or a little later, nuclear arms came into some other NATO countries.

Now put yourself in our position. Could we watch impartially as one surrounded us on all sides with military bases, as a growing number of carriers of atomic death in different parts of Europe were aimed at Soviet towns and factories, regardless in what shape: as sea- or land-based missiles, bombers or the like? The Soviet Union had to build weapons to defend itself, not to threaten anybody, Europe least of all. We built them and stationed them on our own territory and in an amount that counterbalances the arsenal of those who have declared themselves our potential opponents.

Comparison of Weapons Units

Let's look at how the relationship of the nuclear forces in Europe really stacks up.

If one counts as medium-range weapons on NATO's side the main nu-

clear missile and air force units in territories of West European countries and waters bordering on Europe that can reach targets in the Soviet Union—that is, those with a range of a thousand kilometers and more (of course, below the intercontinental range)—as well as the Soviet arms of corresponding range stationed in the European part of the U.S.S.R., there is at present in Europe an approximate parity between NATO and the U.S.S.R. in such weapons.

The NATO countries have here 996 carriers of this type, of which the United States alone has more than 700 (F-111's, FB-111's, F-4's and airplanes aboard aircraft carriers in the seas and oceans around Europe). A further 64 ballistic missiles and 55 bombers are in the British force. France has 144 units (58 missiles and 46 bombers).

The Soviet SS-20

The Soviet Union has 975 units of similar arms at its disposal. The situation has not changed even as the Soviet Union has begun to exchange the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 for the more modern SS-20 type. With the installation of a new missile we withdraw one or two old ones from our arsenal in order to scrap them together with the launch pads.

It is true that the SS-20 can carry three warheads. But their total detonating power is less than that of one of the old types. And so it follows that in the process of exchanging outmoded missiles the number of delivery systems at our disposal decreased and at the same time the overall strength of our medium-range potential was diminished.

But NATO's medium-range weapons are also constantly being improved and added to. In Britain, for example, aboard the Polaris submarines there are modernized ballistic rockets with six warheads (instead of the three so far). In France, it is planned to replace the land- and sea-based missiles carrying one warhead with missiles carrying seven warheads. The number of French missile-carrying submarines will also be increased. And this even though NATO is already one and a half times superior in the number of nuclear warheads capable of reaching combat targets—a very essential criterion.

The Issue of 'Superiority'

These data show unmistakably that the fuss made by NATO about "unacceptable superiority" of the U.S.S.R. in medium-range weapons and the "necessity of rearmament" is without foundation. If anyone, then the Soviet Union should bring up the question of rearmament.

When almost 600 additional missiles are stationed in Western Europe, NATO will achieve a superiority of one and a half times in the number of delivery systems and a superiority of about two times in the number of nuclear warheads. Is it perhaps not obvious that it thereby could come to a significant disturbance of the existing approximate balance (considering all factors) and that a serious threat to the security of the USSR and its allies would arise?

Just think of how the U.S.A. reacted two decades ago when at the request of the Castro Government a few dozen Soviet missiles were to be stationed in Cuba. Cries were raised in Washington: mortal threat to the U.S.A. But now one tries to persuade us that the forward-based American nuclear arms along our Western border are taboo and cannot be a topic of discussion. What is undertaken by us to neutralize the existing threat is declared as being "in excess of the defensive requirements of the U.S.S.R." On the contrary, the intention to station in front of our door hundreds of the newest American missiles beyond all those already at hand is passed off as a "defensive measure."

Talks to Begin in Geneva

Meanwhile, we have agreed with the U.S.A. on the resumption of the negotiations about medium-range nuclear arms. They will begin shortly in Geneva. The U.S.S.R. welcomes this agreement.

At the same time the following must not be passed over in silence: Even as the negotiations draw nearer, claims from the American side, and at a rather high level, are made ever more frequently for a "special position" of the U.S.A.

It is hard to see the logic at the bottom of this attitude. In any case, it has not the least to do with objectivity or with realism.

Rather it is to be assumed that the originators of such "suggestions" in reality don't want negotiations at all, let alone successful ones. They need a failure of the negotiations as a kind of alibi for the continuation of the planned arms buildup and the intended transformation of Western Europe into a launching pad for new American missiles targeted at the U.S.S.R. They are building, from the very beginning, a dead end for the negotiations so that they can then say: See, the U.S.S.R. doesn't care about

the opinions of the West, so there is nothing for the U.S. to do but station the rockets.

Ready for Reductions

Who is going to press the start button for the missiles? In which of the "two and a half" wars Secretary Weinberger is playing through will they be activated? To realize the essence of what's going on it is enough to pose these and some similar questions. We should take into consideration that the targets of the American rockets are strategic objects on the territory of the U.S.S.R. and that the new American carriers can be used as first-strike weapons.

As we said before: we would be ready to reduce the total of Soviet missiles in the event of a reasonable position being adopted by the U.S., if the NATO plans for new missile weapons were dropped. I will add: we would be prepared to reach agreement on very substantial reductions on both sides.

If it is a question of the necessity of taking into account the nuclear weapons potential of the NATO allies of the U.S., we simply suggest counting in what is already there. The Soviet Union does not insist on the reduction of this particular potential.

Precisely in order to make it easier to reach a practical solution of the problem we have also made the suggestion—and we make it again—of deciding on a moratorium on stationing new medium-range missiles by NATO and the U.S.S.R. effective on Nov. 30 of this year, when the negotiations begin, to stay in effect until a treaty is completed. The NATO countries would install no Pershing-2 missiles, no cruise missiles and no other medium-range nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union would stop installing SS-20 rockets.

Strategic Arms Talks

Q. President Reagan's Administration does not want anything to do with the SALT II treaty negotiated between Washington and Moscow. Do you think there is a realistic expectation of reviving it?

A. If I am asked about the SALT II treaty I always have to think back on the difficult and tedious negotiations on various levels that preceded its completion. The finished treaty reflected a precisely measured balance of interests of both sides. At the time of its completion, the Soviet Union had more warhead carriers, the U.S. had more warheads. But we said we were prepared to reduce the number of strategic weapons vehicles by about 10 percent, or 254 units, when the treaty went into effect.

It is not our fault that the treaty—perhaps the most important of all arms control treaties—has not gone into effect.

In Washington, the refusal to ratify the SALT II treaty is justified by saying the U.S. was behind the Soviet Union, which supposedly had some great advantage in strategic weapons already or was about to achieve it. In reality, however, the treaty would rule out advantages for each side.

I declare quite emphatically: the Soviet Union has done nothing since the signature of the SALT II treaty in 1979 in the area of strategic arms which could lead to a change in the existing approximate situation of parity. In contrast, new military programs are continually being approved in the United States. It looks as though in Washington they are not working toward reductions but toward increases in strategic arms and toward making the negotiations depend on the speed of the armaments assembly lines.

The Means of Verification

A little on the question of verification. In Washington they like to say that arms limitation treaties should be subject to careful verification. Who is against that? We, too, want to be certain that the United States fulfills its obligations. Therefore we are interested in verification no less than the U.S.—and maybe even more.

But in the U.S., plans of various kinds are being discussed in all seriousness for concealing intercontinental missiles more thoroughly and excluding them from verification by the other side's technical means.

Not in the Soviet Union, but in the U.S., scenarios for a surprise pre-emptive nuclear strike are being rehearsed.

Our position is to abstain from a nuclear first strike. We, just like the U.S., have experience with verification of the SALT I agreements. We are convinced that each side's own means guarantee the necessary verification. The effectiveness of these means of observation, including space technology, is continually being improved so that the applicability of national means is increasing. The American Administration certainly knows this. But if mutual trust is achieved, other forms of verification can also be developed. But in any case, national means of verification have to have priority for they correspond better to the security interests of each side.

NYT 4 Nov 1981

MOSCOW RULES OUT A PREVENTIVE WAR

Continued From Page A1

States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Western diplomats said the statement seemed partly designed to court public opinion in West Germany in advance of Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn, scheduled for Nov. 22 to 25. The Soviet Union has taken pains to nurture West German resistance to plans by the Atlantic alliance to deploy 572 new medium-range missiles in Western Europe. All 108 Pershing-2 missiles envisaged in the plan are to be deployed in West Germany.

The publication of Mr. Brezhnev's comments in the Soviet Union appeared an attempt to enhance the official image of the leadership as "champions of peace" and to prime the populace for talks on medium-range nuclear forces, scheduled to begin in Geneva next month, and on strategic nuclear weapons next year.

The Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev said, will participate in both talks "fairly and constructively."

West Germans Said to Face Choice

His message to the West Germans, according to diplomats, was that they faced "decisions of a fundamental order" — a continuation of the détente policies of the past decade or "fruitless and dangerous confrontations." Continued cooperation with the Soviet Union, he said, would lead to more trade and larger deals like the proposed additional pipeline from West Siberian gas fields.

In an apparent allusion to an impromptu comment by President Reagan last month, Mr. Brezhnev assailed what he described as the "utterances of some politicians in the West" that a limited nuclear exchange was possible.

"Maybe someone really hopes that it will be possible to confine a nuclear war to the territory of Europe, and considers it an acceptable alternative for himself," Mr. Brezhnev said.

Arguing against the need for new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe, he offered figures to support his contention that the new weapons would give the West a 50 percent advantage in warhead carriers and a 100 percent advantage in warhead yield, or detonating power.

Soviet Replacing Older Missiles

Mr. Brezhnev said the Atlantic alliance had 988 medium-range weapons within 1,000 kilometers (600 miles) of the Soviet Union compared to the 975 Soviet weapons.

He contended that the replacement of older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the more advanced SS-20 — in accordance with recent Soviet practice, Mr. Brezhnev used the NATO designations — served in the long run to reduce the Soviet Union's potential on the ground that the combined detonating power of the three warheads on the SS-20 was less than that of the single warheads on the two older types of missiles.

Western military analysts said the numbers cited by Mr. Brezhnev did not include Soviet missiles deployed east of the Urals, in Asia, and still within range of Western Europe. They also pointed out that his figures for delivery vehicles included forward-based American planes in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers without counting the Soviet counterparts — the SU-17, the MIG-23 and MIG-27, and the SU-24.

Other Discrepancies Are Noted

Listing other discrepancies, Western experts contend that the deployment of the SS-20's has already upset the balance of forces in Europe. The planned deployment of the new American missiles in Europe is designed to right the imbalance, according to this view.

Mr. Brezhnev said the "fuss made by NATO about 'unacceptable superiority' of the U.S.S.R. in medium-range weapons" was without foundation.

He also contended that the latest strategic arms limitation treaty, signed in 1979 by President Carter but rejected by the Reagan Administration as favoring Moscow, provided for a balance of strength between the Soviet Union and the United States. Mr. Brezhnev said that, even though the treaty had not been ratified, Moscow had taken no steps to enhance its strategic potential.

"I declare quite emphatically," Mr. Brezhnev said, "the Soviet Union has done nothing since the signature of the SALT II treaty in 1979 in the area of strategic arms which would lead to a change in the existing approximate situation of parity."

NYT 4 Nov '81